Impossibility of deception in a conflict among subjects with interdependent preference

Takehiro Inohara*, Shingo Takahashi, Bunpei Nakano

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we treat strategic information exchange among subjects in a conflict that involves incompleteness of information in terms of subjects' preference and their interdependence. Then, we give two theorems that indicate senselessness of deceit. One of the theorems implies that any attempt of a subject to change another subject's preference by deceit will end in failure. The other theorem implies that deceit of a subject causes changes of preference of the subject, thus strategic information exchange cannot be effective.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)221-244
ページ数24
ジャーナルApplied Mathematics and Computation
81
2-3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1997 1月 1
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 計算数学
  • 応用数学

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