Impossibility theorems with interpersonally comparable welfare levels: The "extended sympathy approach" reconsidered

Ryo Ichi Nagahisa, Koichi Suga

研究成果: Article

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We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)171-190
ページ数20
ジャーナルJapanese Economic Review
49
発行部数2
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 1998 1 1

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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