Incentive-based economic and physical integration for dynamic power networks

Yasuaki Wasa*, Toshiyuki Murao, Ken Ichi Akao

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Chapter

抄録

This chapter describes an incentive-based market that integrates the economic layer and the physical layer to guarantee high-quality physical ancillary services in dynamic power networks. Toward the full liberalization of the electricity markets, it is indispensable to develop a socially optimal regulation market with a high-speed market-clearing mechanism while preventing maliciously strategic biddings of market participants called agents. To realize the markets, the utility functioning as a system operator prepares an appropriate incentive mechanism to elicit the agents’ private information. We refer to this real-time incentive-enabled market as an incentivizing market. After illustrating the issues of the agents’ strategic biddings without incentive mechanisms, we mainly propose incentivizing market mechanisms for moral hazard problems and adverse selection problems in dynamic power networks, respectively. We also discuss features, possibilities, and limitations of our proposed mechanisms through simulations for linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) power networks.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルEconomically Enabled Energy Management
ホスト出版物のサブタイトルInterplay Between Control Engineering and Economics
出版社Springer Singapore
ページ181-211
ページ数31
ISBN(電子版)9789811535765
ISBN(印刷版)9789811535758
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 1 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)
  • ビジネス、管理および会計(全般)
  • 工学(全般)

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