Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations

Shoma Tanabe, Hideyuki Suzuki, Naoki Masuda*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

20 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)338-347
ページ数10
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Biology
317
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 1 21
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • モデリングとシミュレーション
  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 免疫学および微生物学(全般)
  • 農業および生物科学(全般)
  • 応用数学

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