Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: 1

Pradeep Dubey*, Mamoru Kaneko

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

19 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)111-139
ページ数29
ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
8
2
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1984
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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