TY - JOUR
T1 - Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games
T2 - 1
AU - Dubey, Pradeep
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
PY - 1984
Y1 - 1984
N2 - In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.
AB - In this paper we explore the relation between information patterns and Nash Equilibria in extensive games. By information we mean what players know about moves made by others, as well as by chance. For the most part we confine ourselves to pure strategies. But in Section 2 behavioral strategies are also examined. It turns out that they can be modeled as pure strategies of an appropriately enlarged game. Our results, applied to the enlarged game, can then be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral strategies of the original game.
KW - anti-folk theorem
KW - Extensive game
KW - folk theorem
KW - information patterns
KW - Nash Equilibrium
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U2 - 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8
DO - 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90011-8
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037947461
VL - 8
SP - 111
EP - 139
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
SN - 0165-4896
IS - 2
ER -