TY - JOUR
T1 - Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II
AU - Dubey, Pradeep
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
PY - 1985
Y1 - 1985
N2 - In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.
AB - In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.
KW - primitive Nash play
KW - replication of an extensive game
KW - ε{lunate}-Nash equilibrium
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U2 - 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9
DO - 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0037916343
VL - 10
SP - 247
EP - 262
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
SN - 0165-4896
IS - 3
ER -