Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games - II

Pradeep Dubey*, Mamoru Kaneko

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

6 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In Part I of this paper we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of the these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)247-262
ページ数16
ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
10
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1985
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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