Institutionalize reciprocity to overcome the public goods provision problem

Hiroki Ozono, Yoshio Kamijo, Kazumi Shimizu*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Cooperation is fundamental to human societies, and one of the important paths for its emergence and maintenance is reciprocity. In prisoner's dilemma (PD) experiments, reciprocal strategies are often effective at attaining and maintaining high cooperation. In many public goods (PG) games or n-person PD experiments, however, reciprocal strategies are not successful at engendering cooperation. In the present paper, we attribute this difficulty to a coordination problem against free riding among reciprocators: Because it is difficult for the reciprocators to coordinate their behaviors against free riders, this may lead to inequality among players, which will demotivate them from cooperating in future rounds. We propose a new mechanism, institutionalized reciprocity (IR), which refers to embedding the reciprocal strategy as an institution (i.e., institutionalizing the reciprocal strategy). We experimentally demonstrate that IR can prevent groups of reciprocators from falling into coordination failure and achieve high cooperation in PG games. In conclusion, we argue that a natural extension of the present study will be to investigate the possibility of IR to serve as a collective punishment system.

本文言語English
論文番号e0154321
ジャーナルPloS one
11
6
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2016 6月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 農業および生物科学(全般)
  • 一般

フィンガープリント

「Institutionalize reciprocity to overcome the public goods provision problem」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル