Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration

Ken Yahagi*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

抄録

This paper proposes a simple framework consisting of a law enforcement model in which criminal organizations (Mafias) can collaborate with each other to control an illegal market. Within this framework, we investigate two different situations: (1) a single monopolistic criminal organization operation or (2) an organization collaborating with another criminal organization. Depending on the quality of the controlled illegal market, the welfare implications of these scenarios vary. This paper also investigates an incentive for criminal organizations to engage in endogenous cooperation. As a result, we explore how criminal organizations’ incentives coincide with social welfare implications.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)351-363
ページ数13
ジャーナルEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
48
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 12 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 法学

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