Learning games

Nobuyuki Hanaki*, Ryuichiro Ishikawa, Eizo Akiyama

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1739-1756
ページ数18
ジャーナルJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
33
10
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2009 10月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 制御と最適化
  • 応用数学

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