Legislative term limits and government spending: Theory and evidence from the United States

Yasushi Asako, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, Michiko Ueda

    研究成果: Article

    抄録

    What are the fiscal consequences of legislative term limits? To answer this question, we first develop a legislative bargaining model that describes negotiations over the allocation of distributive projects among legislators with different levels of seniority. Building on several predictions from the model, we develop two hypotheses for empirical testing. First, the adoption of term limits that results in a larger reduction in the variance of seniority within a legislature increases the amount of government spending. Second, legislatures that adopt stricter term limits increase the amount of government spending, while legislatures that adopt moderate term limits show no change in the amount. We provide evidence for these hypotheses using panel data for 49 US state legislatures between 1980 and 2010.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)1501-1538
    ページ数38
    ジャーナルB.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
    16
    発行部数3
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2016 9 1

    Fingerprint

    Term limits
    Legislatures
    Government spending
    Seniority
    Panel data
    Fiscal
    Bargaining model
    Testing
    U.S. States
    Prediction
    Legislative bargaining

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics
    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)

    これを引用

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