Linking Decisions with Standardization

    研究成果: Article

    抄録

    This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)35-48
    ページ数14
    ジャーナルStudies in Microeconomics
    3
    発行部数1
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2015 6 1

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    Standardization

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

    これを引用

    Linking Decisions with Standardization. / Veszteg, Robert Ferenc.

    :: Studies in Microeconomics, 巻 3, 番号 1, 01.06.2015, p. 35-48.

    研究成果: Article

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