Lobby interaction and trade policy

Tatyana Chesnokova*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

The paper introduces interaction between organized lobbies in the protection-for-sale framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions such that the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the protection-for-sale model, not only the proportion of the population that owns capital in the organized sectors, but also the number of lobbies, matters for trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has a nonmonotone effect on each lobby's contribution.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)749-765
ページ数17
ジャーナルJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
170
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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