Main bank relationships and capital structure in Japan

Atsuo Fukuda*, Shin'Ichi Hirota

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

22 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we argue that the main bank in Japan acts as a quasi-inside monitor of the firm, delegated by other lenders, and that main bank relationships increase the debt capacity of the firm by reducing the agency cost of debt. On the other hand, firms with high debt ratios will strengthen main bank relationships due to the agency problems associated with high leverage. Thus, the debt ratio and main bank relationships are simultaneously determined and have positive effects on each other. The empirical results we obtain support these hypotheses. J. Japan. Int. Econ. September 1996, 10(3), pp. 250-261. Department of Economics, Kyoto Sangyo University, Kamigamo, Kitaku, Kyoto 603, Japan; and Department of Business Administration and Information, Setsunan University, Ikedanakamachi, Neyagawa, Osaka 572, Japan.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)250-261
ページ数12
ジャーナルJournal of The Japanese and International Economies
10
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 1996 9
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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