Managerial control inside the firm

研究成果: Article

7 引用 (Scopus)


This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue the long-term viability of a firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control mechanism may not contradict shareholder value maximization. However, when the firm needs restructuring, this mechanism diminishes firm value. We discuss when external governance is desirable, and when it is not. Our model also offers economic explanations for some related issues in managerial behavior, such as restructuring aversion, survival motive, and excessive risk aversion. J. Japanese Int. Economies 21 (3) (2007) 324-335.

ジャーナルJournal of The Japanese and International Economies
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Political Science and International Relations

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