Mixed oligopoly: Analysis of consistent equilibria

Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov*, Vladimir A. Bulavsky, Nataliya I. Kalashnykova, Junzo Watada, Diego De Jesús Hernández-Rodríguez

*この研究の対応する著者

    研究成果: Article査読

    4 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    In this paper, a model of mixed oligopoly with conjectured variations equilibrium (CVE) is examined, in which one of the agents maximizes a convex combination of its net profit with the domestic social surplus. The agents' conjectures concern the price variations, which depend on the variations in their production outputs. Using the established existence and uniqueness results for the CVE (the exterior equilibrium ) for any fixed set of feasible conjectures, the notion of the interior equilibrium is introduced by developing a conjecture consistency criterion. Then, the existence theoremfor the interior equilibrium (defined as a CVE state with consistent conjectures ) is proven. When the convex combination coefficient tends to 1 (thus transforming the model into the mixed oligopoly in its extreme form), two trends are apparent. First, for private companies, the equilibrium with consistent conjectures becomes more proficient than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Second, there exists a (unique) value of the convex combination coefficient such that the private agent's aggregate profit is the same in both the above-mentioned equilibria, which makes subsidies to producers or consumers unnecessary.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)971-984
    ページ数14
    ジャーナルJournal of Advanced Computational Intelligence and Intelligent Informatics
    18
    6
    出版ステータスPublished - 2014 11月 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • 人工知能
    • コンピュータ ビジョンおよびパターン認識
    • 人間とコンピュータの相互作用

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