Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets

研究成果: Article

20 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

Objective: To obtain axiomatic characterizations of the core of one-to-one and one-to-many matching markets. Methods: The axioms recently applied to characterize the core of assignment games were adapted to the models of this paper. Results: The core of one-to-one matching markets is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first one consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity. The second consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and consistency. If we allow for weak preferences, the core is characterized by weak unanimity, population monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, and consistency. For one-to-many matchings, the same lists as for the case of strict preferences characterize the core. Conclusions: The cores of the discrete matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the continuous matching markets. This provides an axiomatic explanation for the observations in the literature that almost parallel properties are obtained for the core of the two models. We observe that Maskin monotonicity is closely related to consistency in matching markets.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)13-31
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
34
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2006 4

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Monotonicity
Axioms
market
One to many
Market
Matching markets
Overlap
Assignment
Game
Population monotonicity
Unanimity
Maskin monotonicity
Model

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)

これを引用

Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets. / Toda, Manabu.

:: International Journal of Game Theory, 巻 34, 番号 1, 04.2006, p. 13-31.

研究成果: Article

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