Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets

研究成果: Article査読

20 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Objective: To obtain axiomatic characterizations of the core of one-to-one and one-to-many matching markets. Methods: The axioms recently applied to characterize the core of assignment games were adapted to the models of this paper. Results: The core of one-to-one matching markets is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first one consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity. The second consists of weak unanimity, population monotonicity, and consistency. If we allow for weak preferences, the core is characterized by weak unanimity, population monotonicity, Maskin monotonicity, and consistency. For one-to-many matchings, the same lists as for the case of strict preferences characterize the core. Conclusions: The cores of the discrete matching markets are characterized by axioms that almost overlap with the axioms characterizing the core of the continuous matching markets. This provides an axiomatic explanation for the observations in the literature that almost parallel properties are obtained for the core of the two models. We observe that Maskin monotonicity is closely related to consistency in matching markets.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)13-31
ページ数19
ジャーナルInternational Journal of Game Theory
34
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2006 4 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 数学(その他)
  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

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