抄録
This chapter aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this chapter can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.
| 元の言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ホスト出版物のタイトル | Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics |
| ホスト出版物のサブタイトル | Topics in Behavioral Economics |
| 出版者 | Springer Japan |
| ページ | 483-517 |
| ページ数 | 35 |
| ISBN（電子版） | 9784431555018 |
| ISBN（印刷物） | 9784431555001 |
| DOI | |
| 出版物ステータス | Published - 2015 9 12 |
| 外部発表 | Yes |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
- Business, Management and Accounting(all)
- Psychology(all)
これを引用
Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences. / Itoh, Hideshi.
Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics: Topics in Behavioral Economics. Springer Japan, 2015. p. 483-517.研究成果: Chapter
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TY - CHAP
T1 - Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences
AU - Itoh, Hideshi
PY - 2015/9/12
Y1 - 2015/9/12
N2 - This chapter aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this chapter can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.
AB - This chapter aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this chapter can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.
KW - Behavioral contract theory
KW - Inequity aversion
KW - Moral hazard
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84956500043&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-4-431-55501-8_17
DO - 10.1007/978-4-431-55501-8_17
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:84956500043
SN - 9784431555001
SP - 483
EP - 517
BT - Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics
PB - Springer Japan
ER -