Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

研究成果: Chapter

抜粋

This chapter aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this chapter can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.

元の言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルBehavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics
ホスト出版物のサブタイトルTopics in Behavioral Economics
出版者Springer Japan
ページ483-517
ページ数35
ISBN(電子版)9784431555018
ISBN(印刷物)9784431555001
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2015 9 12
外部発表Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Psychology(all)

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  • これを引用

    Itoh, H. (2015). Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences. : Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics: Topics in Behavioral Economics (pp. 483-517). Springer Japan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55501-8_17