Noisy talk

Andreas Blume, Oliver J. Board, Kohei Kawamura

研究成果: Article

71 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences-and a uniform Pipe distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there eidsts a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the-model Without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)395-440
ページ数46
ジャーナルTheoretical Economics
2
発行部数4
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 12
外部発表Yes

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Communication
Strategic information transmission

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

これを引用

Blume, A., Board, O. J., & Kawamura, K. (2007). Noisy talk. Theoretical Economics, 2(4), 395-440.

Noisy talk. / Blume, Andreas; Board, Oliver J.; Kawamura, Kohei.

:: Theoretical Economics, 巻 2, 番号 4, 12.2007, p. 395-440.

研究成果: Article

Blume, A, Board, OJ & Kawamura, K 2007, 'Noisy talk', Theoretical Economics, 巻. 2, 番号 4, pp. 395-440.
Blume A, Board OJ, Kawamura K. Noisy talk. Theoretical Economics. 2007 12;2(4):395-440.
Blume, Andreas ; Board, Oliver J. ; Kawamura, Kohei. / Noisy talk. :: Theoretical Economics. 2007 ; 巻 2, 番号 4. pp. 395-440.
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