Noisy talk

Andreas Blume*, Oliver J. Board, Kohei Kawamura

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

82 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences-and a uniform Pipe distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there eidsts a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the-model Without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)395-440
ページ数46
ジャーナルTheoretical Economics
2
4
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 12
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)

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