Noisy talk

Andreas Blume, Oliver J. Board, Kohei Kawamura

研究成果: Article

72 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences-and a uniform Pipe distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there eidsts a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the-model Without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)395-440
ページ数46
ジャーナルTheoretical Economics
2
発行部数4
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 12 1

    フィンガープリント

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

これを引用

Blume, A., Board, O. J., & Kawamura, K. (2007). Noisy talk. Theoretical Economics, 2(4), 395-440.