On the Relationship between the VCG Mechanism and Market Clearing

Takashi Tanaka, Na Li, Kenko Uchida

    研究成果: Conference contribution

    3 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    We consider a social cost minimization problem with equality and inequality constraints in which a central coordinator allocates infinitely divisible goods to self-interested N firms under information asymmetry. We consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and study its connection to an alternative mechanism based on market clearing-price. Under the considered set up, we show that the VCG payments are equal to the path integrals of the vector field of the market clearing prices, indicating a close relationship between the VCG mechanism and the 'clearing-price' mechanism. We then discuss its implications for the electricity market design and also exploit this connection to analyze the budget balance of the VCG mechanism.

    本文言語English
    ホスト出版物のタイトル2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
    出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    ページ4597-4603
    ページ数7
    2018-June
    ISBN(印刷版)9781538654286
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2018 8 9
    イベント2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 - Milwauke, United States
    継続期間: 2018 6 272018 6 29

    Other

    Other2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018
    CountryUnited States
    CityMilwauke
    Period18/6/2718/6/29

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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