抄録
We consider a social cost minimization problem with equality and inequality constraints in which a central coordinator allocates infinitely divisible goods to self-interested N firms under information asymmetry. We consider the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and study its connection to an alternative mechanism based on market clearing-price. Under the considered set up, we show that the VCG payments are equal to the path integrals of the vector field of the market clearing prices, indicating a close relationship between the VCG mechanism and the 'clearing-price' mechanism. We then discuss its implications for the electricity market design and also exploit this connection to analyze the budget balance of the VCG mechanism.
本文言語 | English |
---|---|
ホスト出版物のタイトル | 2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 |
出版社 | Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. |
ページ | 4597-4603 |
ページ数 | 7 |
巻 | 2018-June |
ISBN(印刷版) | 9781538654286 |
DOI | |
出版ステータス | Published - 2018 8月 9 |
イベント | 2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 - Milwauke, United States 継続期間: 2018 6月 27 → 2018 6月 29 |
Other
Other | 2018 Annual American Control Conference, ACC 2018 |
---|---|
国/地域 | United States |
City | Milwauke |
Period | 18/6/27 → 18/6/29 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 電子工学および電気工学