One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies

Atsushi Fujioka, Katsuyuki Takashima, Kazuki Yoneyama*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Conference contribution

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper proposes two one-round authenticated group key exchange protocols from newly employed cryptographic invariant maps (CIMs): one is secure in the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former (resp. latter) is proved under the n-way decisional (resp. n-way gap) Diffie–Hellman assumption on the CIMs in the quantum random (resp. random) oracle model. We instantiate the proposed protocols on the hard homogeneous spaces with limitation where the number of the user group is two. In particular, the protocols instantiated by using the CSIDH, commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman, key exchange are currently more realistic than the general n-party CIM-based ones due to its realizability. Our two-party one-round protocols are secure against quantum adversaries.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルProvable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings
編集者Ron Steinfeld, Tsz Hon Yuen
出版社Springer
ページ330-338
ページ数9
ISBN(印刷版)9783030319182
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019
外部発表はい
イベント13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2019 - Cairns, Australia
継続期間: 2019 10 12019 10 4

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
11821 LNCS
ISSN(印刷版)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

Conference

Conference13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2019
国/地域Australia
CityCairns
Period19/10/119/10/4

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 理論的コンピュータサイエンス
  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)

フィンガープリント

「One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル