Optimal Dynamic Incentive and Control Contract among Principal and Agents with Moral Hazard and Long-Term Average Reward

Yasuaki Wasa, Kenko Uchida

研究成果: Conference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper addresses a novel incentive and control mechanism among a principal and multiple agents with long-term average reward in stochastically dynamical systems. In actual physical systems such as dynamic power systems, the principal called a system operator cannot directly operate the agents' control input in real time to guarantee the agents' voluntary decision makings. Meanwhile, the operations maximizing the agents' own profit is not always to achieve the social welfare maximization, which is the principal's objective. To avoid such moral hazard, adopting a contract theory approach, we first propose a dynamic incentive and control synthesis problem, where each agent and the principal maximize their own long-term average reward, respectively. We next derive an optimal contract condition and stability condition analytically. Finally, the performance of the proposed contract mechanism is numerically verified through simulations with a four area power network model.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2019 12th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2019
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ31-36
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9784888983006
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 6
イベント12th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2019 - Kitakyushu-shi, Japan
継続期間: 2019 6 92019 6 12

出版物シリーズ

名前2019 12th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2019

Conference

Conference12th Asian Control Conference, ASCC 2019
国/地域Japan
CityKitakyushu-shi
Period19/6/919/6/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • コンピュータ サイエンスの応用
  • 制御と最適化
  • 機械工学

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