Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players

Naoki Masuda*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

8 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players who have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)181-189
ページ数9
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Biology
251
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2008 3 7
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • モデリングとシミュレーション
  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 免疫学および微生物学(全般)
  • 農業および生物科学(全般)
  • 応用数学

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