Over-nominating candidates, undermining the party: The collective action problem under SNTV in Japan

Kuniaki Nemoto, Robert Pekkanen, Ellis Krauss

    研究成果: Article

    5 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    Any political party has a profound interest in maximizing seats, which in turn requires running the optimum number of candidates. However, to do this presumes solving a collective action problem among self-interested party members or leaders, and is deeply conditioned by the electoral system. The case of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party under the Single Non-Transferable Vote electoral system provides a superb illustration of how party leaders, even in a famously electorally successful party, will be unable to solve these dilemmas because of key facilitating institutions: first, party president selection rules; second, prime ministerial control over allocation of positions; third, a weak party label. Contrary to existing literature, we find ambitious factions consistently nominated too many candidates - deliberately risking the party's losing seats. We draw attention to the sources of party strength in a novel way, and to how party rules interact with electoral systems to shape both parties and politics.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)740-750
    ページ数11
    ジャーナルParty Politics
    20
    発行部数5
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2014

    Fingerprint

    electoral system
    collective behavior
    candidacy
    Japan
    leader
    party member
    faction
    voter
    president
    politics

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

    これを引用

    Over-nominating candidates, undermining the party : The collective action problem under SNTV in Japan. / Nemoto, Kuniaki; Pekkanen, Robert; Krauss, Ellis.

    :: Party Politics, 巻 20, 番号 5, 2014, p. 740-750.

    研究成果: Article

    Nemoto, Kuniaki ; Pekkanen, Robert ; Krauss, Ellis. / Over-nominating candidates, undermining the party : The collective action problem under SNTV in Japan. :: Party Politics. 2014 ; 巻 20, 番号 5. pp. 740-750.
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