Participation costs dismiss the advantage of heterogeneous networks in evolution of cooperation

Naoki Masuda*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

149 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Real social interactions occur on networks in which each individual is connected to some, but not all, of others. In social dilemma games with a fixed population size, heterogeneity in the number of contacts per player is known to promote evolution of cooperation. Under a common assumption of positively biased pay-off structure, well-connected players earn much by playing frequently, and cooperation once adopted by well-connected players is unbeatable and spreads to others. However, maintaining a social contact can be costly, which would prevent local pay-offs from being positively biased. In replicator-type evolutionary dynamics, it is shown that even a relatively small participation cost extinguishes the merit of heterogeneous networks in terms of cooperation. In this situation, more connected players earn less so that they are no longer spreaders of cooperation. Instead, those with fewer contacts win and guide the evolution. The participation cost, or the baseline pay-off, is irrelevant in homogeneous populations, but is essential for evolutionary games on heterogeneous networks.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)1815-1821
ページ数7
ジャーナルProceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
274
1620
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 8 7
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 生化学、遺伝学、分子生物学(全般)
  • 免疫学および微生物学(全般)
  • 環境科学(全般)
  • 農業および生物科学(全般)

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