Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan

Yoshikuni Ono*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

26 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

How do the dynamics of portfolio alloction work within parties? While much of the existing literature focuses on portfolio allocation among parties in coalition governments, bargaining over cabinet portfolios also takes place within parties because many parties have internal divisions or factions that influence these decisions. By analyzing data on portfolio allocation in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan from 1960 through 2007, this study demonstrates that, contrary to the proportionality proposition (Gamson's Law), substantial variance exists in allocation outcomes over time because party leaders allocate cabinet portfolios among factions as a means of preventing defections and challenges from their party's members. The resulting portfolio allocation reflects the bargaining dynamics within the party: I find that party leaders surrender more portfolios as they become more vulnerable to challenges posed by internal rivals.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)553-567
ページ数15
ジャーナルAmerican Journal of Political Science
56
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012 7月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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