Poster: Is active electromagnetic side-channel attack practical?

Satohiro Wakabayashi, Seita Maruyama, Tatsuya Mori, Shigeki Goto, Masahiro Kinugawa, Yu Ichi Hayashi

研究成果: Conference contribution

3 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Radio-frequency (RF) retroreflector attack (RFRA) is an active electromagnetic side-channel attack that aims to leak the target's internal signals by irradiating the targeted device with a radio wave, where an attacker has embedded a malicious circuit (RF retroreflector) in the device in advance. As the retroreflector consists of small and cheap electrical elements such as a field-effect transistor (FET) chip and a wire that can work as a dipole antenna, the reflector can be embedded into various kinds of electric devices that carry unencrypted, sensitive information; e.g., keyboard, display monitor, microphone, speaker, USB, and so on. Only a few studies have addressed the basic mechanism of RFRA and demonstrated the success of the attack. The conditions for a successful attack have not been adequately explored before, and therefore, assessing the feasibility of the attack remains an open issue. In the present study, we aim to investigate empirically the conditions for a successful RFRA through field experiments. Understanding attack limitations should help to develop effective countermeasures against it. In particular, with regard to the conditions for a successful attack, we studied the distance between the attacker and the target, and the target signal frequencies. Through the extensive experiments using off-the-shelf hardware including software-defined radio (SDR) equipment, we revealed that the required conditions for a successful attack are (1) up to a 10-Mbps of target signal and (2) up to a distance of 10 meters. These results demonstrate the importance of the RFRA threat in the real world.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルCCS 2017 - Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
出版社Association for Computing Machinery
ページ2587-2589
ページ数3
ISBN(電子版)9781450349468
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 10 30
イベント24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2017 - Dallas, United States
継続期間: 2017 10 302017 11 3

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
ISSN(印刷版)1543-7221

Other

Other24th ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2017
国/地域United States
CityDallas
Period17/10/3017/11/3

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ソフトウェア
  • コンピュータ ネットワークおよび通信

フィンガープリント

「Poster: Is active electromagnetic side-channel attack practical?」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル