Price discrimination of digital content

研究成果: Article

1 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self-production is more efficient than that of a producer.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)421-426
ページ数6
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
93
発行部数3
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2006 12

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Price discrimination
Digital content
Copying
Social welfare
Price strategy
Incomplete information
Profit
Separability
Optimal pricing
Two-part tariff
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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance

これを引用

Price discrimination of digital content. / Domon, Koji.

:: Economics Letters, 巻 93, 番号 3, 12.2006, p. 421-426.

研究成果: Article

Domon, Koji. / Price discrimination of digital content. :: Economics Letters. 2006 ; 巻 93, 番号 3. pp. 421-426.
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