Price discrimination of digital content

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper considers the simplest DRM, which permits either free or no copying, with incomplete information about the type of consumer. We first obtain results concerning separability of consumers in a general situation, and show that there is a critical type of consumer. A higher utility type selects a menu of free copying whereas a lower one chooses not to copy. In a two-type model we indicate that optimal pricing for a producer is different from that under two-part tariffs. This price strategy brings about greater profits and social welfare if, and only if, self-production is more efficient than that of a producer.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)421-426
ページ数6
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
93
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2006 12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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