Private law enforcement with competing groups

Ken Yahagi*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. We also investigate consequences when a policy maker acts to maximize a bribe instead of social welfare. Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided. Additionally, this paper shows that depending on the policy maker’s objection between rent-seeking motivation or social welfare maximizer, deterrence effects vary. This paper provides a clear mechanism that the rent-seeking motivated policy maker tends to set less severe enforcement policies than the social welfare level.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)285-297
ページ数13
ジャーナルEconomics of Governance
19
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 8月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(全般)

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