Privatizacija i zagad{stroke}enje okoliša u mješovitom duopolu

Jiancai Pi, Li Yang, Yu Zhou

研究成果: Article

3 引用 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper establishes mixed duopoly game-theoretical models to investigate the economic impacts exerted by privatization in the presence of the environmental pollution. When the residents' environmental preference is introduced to the public firm's objective function, we mainly find that privatization may increase the public firm's output, decrease the private firms' outputs, and exert no impacts on social welfare. These findings run contrast to the common findings of the studies on privatization. Moreover, Cournot competition and Stackelberg competition are separately analyzed to show that our findings are robust and irrelevant with the firms' moves. This paper highlights the role the environmental pollution and residents' environmental preference play in determining the economic impacts exerted by privatization.

元の言語Undefined/Unknown
ページ(範囲)163-192
ページ数30
ジャーナルZbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakultet au Rijeci
31
発行部数2
出版物ステータスPublished - 2013 12 30
外部発表Yes

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Mixed duopoly
Environmental pollution
Privatization
Environmental preferences
Public firm
Residents
Economic impact
Firm objectives
Social welfare
Stackelberg
Private firms
Objective function
Cournot competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

これを引用

Privatizacija i zagad{stroke}enje okoliša u mješovitom duopolu. / Pi, Jiancai; Yang, Li; Zhou, Yu.

:: Zbornik Radova Ekonomskog Fakultet au Rijeci, 巻 31, 番号 2, 30.12.2013, p. 163-192.

研究成果: Article

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