Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences

研究成果: Article

17 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

We consider the problem of assigning indivisible goods among a group of agents with lotteries when the preference profile is single-peaked. Unfortunately, even on this restricted domain of preferences, equal treatment of equals, stochastic dominance efficiency, and stochastic dominance strategy-proofness are incompatible.

元の言語English
ページ(範囲)203-215
ページ数13
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
41
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2013 6 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

フィンガープリント Probabilistic assignment of indivisible goods with single-peaked preferences' の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらはともに一意のフィンガープリントを構成します。

  • これを引用