Profit allocation of independent power producers based on cooperative Game theory

N. X. Jia, R. Yokoyama

    研究成果: Article

    42 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    With the development of deregulation, the retail market is being formed. The independent power producers (IPPs) can contact the customers and sell electric power to them directly to obtain the profits because IPPs can provide electricity at cheaper prices to the customers than the utilities can. If IPP can obtain further more profit through collaborating with other ones in some coalition, it will prefer to collaborate to form this coalition rather than participating individually. In coalition, also the problem of how to allocate profit rationally for each IPP should also be solved. In this paper, we discuss the cooperation of IPPs in retail market and give a formulation about the calculation of IPPs profits. After that, based on Game theory, we propose a scheme to decide the profit allocation of each IPP in the coalitions rationally and impartially.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)633-641
    ページ数9
    ジャーナルInternational Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System
    25
    発行部数8
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2003 10

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    Game theory
    Profitability
    Deregulation
    Electricity

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Energy Engineering and Power Technology
    • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

    これを引用

    Profit allocation of independent power producers based on cooperative Game theory. / Jia, N. X.; Yokoyama, R.

    :: International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy System, 巻 25, 番号 8, 10.2003, p. 633-641.

    研究成果: Article

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