Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs

Pedro Mendi, Róbert Veszteg

研究成果: Article査読

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this note, we suggest a link between tariff protection and firms' incentives to engage in a horizontal merger. We consider a Cournot oligopoly with equal, constant marginal costs where firms have to decide on lobbying efforts prior to choosing output. These lobbying efforts will determine whether a prohibitive tariff is introduced. We find that the possibility of lobbying may enlarge the set of mergers that are profitable, even without cost reductions.

本文言語English
ジャーナルEconomics Bulletin
12
22
出版ステータスPublished - 2007 9 25
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

フィンガープリント 「Profitable mergers with endogenous tariffs」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル