Promotion, turnover, earnings, and firm-sponsored training

Hideo Owan*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Review article査読

46 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

I develop a model in which different technological conditions lead to distinct equilibria with different patterns in labor mobility, promotion, earning distribution, and provision of firm-sponsored training. Key is the asymmetric learning of workers' characteristics. Because of the information that is conveyed to the market by promotion, firms have incentives to adopt strategic promotion policies, which result in different patterns in the use of internal labor market. The theory explains well the differences between the Japanese and the United States labor markets.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)955-978
ページ数24
ジャーナルJournal of Labor Economics
22
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2004 10月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 労使関係
  • 経済学、計量経済学

フィンガープリント

「Promotion, turnover, earnings, and firm-sponsored training」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル