Public-goods games with endogenous institution-formation: Experimental evidence on the effect of the voting rule

Yukihiko Funaki, Jiawen Li, Róbert F. Veszteg*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

本文言語English
論文番号52
ジャーナルGames
8
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 12月 2

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 統計学および確率
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性
  • 応用数学

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