Quasi-option value under strategic interactions

Tomoki Fujii*, Ryuichiro Ishikawa

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to various global environmental problems.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)36-54
ページ数19
ジャーナルResource and Energy Economics
34
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2012 1月
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 経済学、計量経済学

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