Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: Consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values

René van den Brink*, Yukihiko Funaki, Yuan Ju

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

67 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

One of the main issues in economic allocation problems is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide three different characterizations of egalitarian Shapley values being convex combinations of the Shapley value and the equal division solution. First, from the perspective of a variable player set, we show that all these solutions satisfy the same reduced game consistency. Second, on a fixed player set, we characterize this class of solutions using monotonicity properties. Finally, towards a strategic foundation, we provide a non-cooperative implementation for these solutions which only differ in the probability of breakdown at a certain stage of the game. These characterizations discover fundamental differences as well as intriguing connections between marginalism and egalitarianism.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)693-714
ページ数22
ジャーナルSocial Choice and Welfare
40
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2013 3月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会科学(その他)
  • 経済学、計量経済学

フィンガープリント

「Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: Consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル