Russell’s theories of judgement

Ryo Ito*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

This paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)112-133
ページ数22
ジャーナルBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
28
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2020 1月 2
外部発表はい

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 哲学

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