Scan-based side-channel attack against RSA cryptosystems using scan signatures

Ryuta Nara*, Kei Satoh, Masao Yanagisawa, Tatsuo Ohtsuki, Nozomu Togawa


研究成果: Article査読

64 被引用数 (Scopus)


Scan-based side-channel attacks retrieve a secret key in a cryptography circuit by analyzing scanned data. Since they must be considerable threats to a cryptosystem LSI, we have to protect cryptography circuits from them. RSA is one of the most important cryptography algorithms because it effectively realizes a public-key cryptography system. RSA is extensively used but conventional scan-based side-channel attacks cannot be applied to it because it has a complicated algorithm. This paper proposes a scan-based side-channel attack which enables us to retrieve a secret key in an RSA circuit. The proposed method is based on detecting intermediate values calculated in an RSA circuit. We focus on a 1-bit timesequence which is specific to some intermediate values. By monitoring the 1-bit time-sequence in the scan path, we can find out the register position specific to the intermediate value and we can know whether this intermediate value is calculated or not in the target RSA circuit. We can retrieve a secret key one-bit by one-bit from MSB to LSB. The experimental results demonstrate that a 1,024-bit secret key used in the target RSA circuit can be retrieved using 30.2 input messages within 98.3 seconds and its 2,048-bit secret key can be retrieved using 34.4 input within 634.0 seconds.

ジャーナルIEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences
出版ステータスPublished - 2010 12月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 信号処理
  • コンピュータ グラフィックスおよびコンピュータ支援設計
  • 電子工学および電気工学
  • 応用数学


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