Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi*

*この研究の対応する著者

    研究成果: Article査読

    1 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)7-13
    ページ数7
    ジャーナルMathematical Social Sciences
    72
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2014 11 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • 統計学、確率および不確実性
    • 社会科学(全般)
    • 心理学(全般)
    • 社会学および政治科学

    フィンガープリント

    「Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

    引用スタイル