TY - JOUR
T1 - Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems
AU - Akahoshi, Takashi
PY - 2014/11/1
Y1 - 2014/11/1
N2 - We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.
AB - We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.
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U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001
DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84908053032
VL - 72
SP - 7
EP - 13
JO - Mathematical Social Sciences
JF - Mathematical Social Sciences
SN - 0165-4896
ER -