Specialization, multiskilling, and allocation of decision rights

Hideo Owan*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Chapter

5 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

The purpose of this chapter is to offer new justification for multiskilling practices such as job rotation and extensive training for broad skills and explain why there appear to exist complementarity between multiskilling and the delegation of decision authority to workers. By developing a new model of incomplete contracting where workers make non-contractable investments in multiple skills, we obtain the key insight that worker investments in firm-specific human capital become strategic substitutes when their skills overlap each other. The "skill substitution effect" analyzed in this chapter induces the following three major results, unless specialization offers a substantial technological advantage: (1) workers' incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital tend to be stronger; (2) the optimal level of delegation is typically higher; and (3) firms' ex post profits tend to be higher with multiskilling than with specialization. The novel implication of the chapter is that multiskilling may be desirable from a firm's viewpoint even if there are no technological or informational task complementarities among the combined skills, which have been believed to be primary reasons for multiskilling in prior works.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルAdvances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms
編集者Jed DeVaro
ページ3-34
ページ数32
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 12月 1
外部発表はい

出版物シリーズ

名前Advances in the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms
12
ISSN(印刷版)0885-3339

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 労使関係
  • 経済学、計量経済学および金融学(その他)

フィンガープリント

「Specialization, multiskilling, and allocation of decision rights」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル