@article{dd89037148a74eb2943600e45462b6b9,
title = "Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation",
abstract = "We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.",
keywords = "CSSB, Coalition formation, Coalition-free inducement relations, Invertible inducement relations, OSSB, Perfect foresight",
author = "Yoshio Kamijo",
note = "Funding Information: From Theorem 3, if the preference relations are strict, an outcome is supported by the OSSB-PFs if and only if it is Pareto component-efficient. Thus, the stability and the efficiency are compatible under the assumptions on the invertible and coalition-free inducement relations and the strict preference relations. On the other hand, if the preference relations are not strict, the OSSB-PF supports all the Pareto component-efficient outcomes but it may support the Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Copyright: Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",
year = "2013",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y",
language = "English",
volume = "75",
pages = "339--357",
journal = "Theory and Decision",
issn = "0040-5833",
publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
number = "3",
}