抄録
Casajus (2008) established a link between coalition formation in hedonic games and players’ preferences over coalition structures. He showed that if a value concept for games with coalition structures (a CS-value) satisfies the splitting property and the aggregate component independence property, then the CS-value induces a hedonic game satisfying the common ranking property and yields a nonempty core. The following question was left open: What CS-values induce a hedonic game that does not satisfy the common ranking property but has a nonempty core? In this paper, we offer a set of properties that induces a hedonic game satisfying the top-coalition property, which is less demanding than the common ranking property but generates a nonempty core.
本文言語 | English |
---|---|
論文番号 | 109750 |
ジャーナル | Economics Letters |
巻 | 200 |
DOI | |
出版ステータス | Published - 2021 3月 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- 財務
- 経済学、計量経済学