Stability and values for games with coalition structures

Takaaki Abe

研究成果: Article査読

抄録

Casajus (2008) established a link between coalition formation in hedonic games and players’ preferences over coalition structures. He showed that if a value concept for games with coalition structures (a CS-value) satisfies the splitting property and the aggregate component independence property, then the CS-value induces a hedonic game satisfying the common ranking property and yields a nonempty core. The following question was left open: What CS-values induce a hedonic game that does not satisfy the common ranking property but has a nonempty core? In this paper, we offer a set of properties that induces a hedonic game satisfying the top-coalition property, which is less demanding than the common ranking property but generates a nonempty core.

本文言語English
論文番号109750
ジャーナルEconomics Letters
200
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2021 3

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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