Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes

Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

本文言語English
論文番号1450006
ジャーナルInternational Game Theory Review
16
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • コンピュータ サイエンス(全般)
  • ビジネスおよび国際経営
  • 統計学、確率および不確実性

フィンガープリント

「Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル