Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

研究成果: Article

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Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

元の言語English
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Politics
DOI
出版物ステータスAccepted/In press - 2019 1 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science

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