Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

Yasushi Asako*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

2 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)626-641
ページ数16
ジャーナルJournal of Theoretical Politics
31
4
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 10 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 社会学および政治科学

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