Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks

Yasuaki Wasa, Toshiyuki Murao, Takashi Tanaka, Kenko Uchida

研究成果: Conference contribution

1 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

In this paper, focusing on agents' strategic behavior in their private information utilization, we formulate two types of strategic bidding problems for a simple dynamic principal-agent type linear quadratic (LQ) network where a principal integrates agents' individual controls into the socially optimal one based on information bid by the agents. One is the case that all the agents minimize their own cost, which is undesirable for the principal. The other is an equilibrium in the presence of the incentive design motivated by the standard contract theory to reduce the wasteful social cost. Then we analytically derive optimal designs of strategic bidding for each type and discuss their implications and implementations.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ3383-3389
ページ数7
ISBN(電子版)9783907144008
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 6 1
イベント18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019 - Naples, Italy
継続期間: 2019 6 252019 6 28

出版物シリーズ

名前2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019

Conference

Conference18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
CountryItaly
CityNaples
Period19/6/2519/6/28

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Instrumentation
  • Control and Optimization

フィンガープリント 「Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks」の研究トピックを掘り下げます。これらがまとまってユニークなフィンガープリントを構成します。

引用スタイル