Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Y. Kamijo*, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果査読

17 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)180-195
ページ数16
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
84
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2014 3

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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