TY - JOUR
T1 - Testable implications of the core in TU market games
AU - Agatsuma, Yasushi
PY - 2016/5/1
Y1 - 2016/5/1
N2 - This paper clarifies testable implications of the core on allocation data in cooperative market games with transferable utility (TU market games). By employing the revealed preference approach, we provide a finite system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to an allocation data set to be consistent with the core of some TU market game. If initial endowment vectors are not observed, it turns out that the core rationalizability is equivalent to the Pareto rationalizability, that is, the core and Pareto optimality are observationally equivalent in TU market games.
AB - This paper clarifies testable implications of the core on allocation data in cooperative market games with transferable utility (TU market games). By employing the revealed preference approach, we provide a finite system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to an allocation data set to be consistent with the core of some TU market game. If initial endowment vectors are not observed, it turns out that the core rationalizability is equivalent to the Pareto rationalizability, that is, the core and Pareto optimality are observationally equivalent in TU market games.
KW - Core rationalization
KW - Market games
KW - Pareto rationalization
KW - Revealed preference
KW - Testable implications
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.005
DO - 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.03.005
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84962821823
VL - 64
SP - 23
EP - 29
JO - Journal of Mathematical Economics
JF - Journal of Mathematical Economics
SN - 0304-4068
ER -