Testable implications of the core in TU market games

Yasushi Agatsuma*

*この研究の対応する著者

    研究成果: Article査読

    1 被引用数 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper clarifies testable implications of the core on allocation data in cooperative market games with transferable utility (TU market games). By employing the revealed preference approach, we provide a finite system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to an allocation data set to be consistent with the core of some TU market game. If initial endowment vectors are not observed, it turns out that the core rationalizability is equivalent to the Pareto rationalizability, that is, the core and Pareto optimality are observationally equivalent in TU market games.

    本文言語English
    ページ(範囲)23-29
    ページ数7
    ジャーナルJournal of Mathematical Economics
    64
    DOI
    出版ステータスPublished - 2016 5 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • 経済学、計量経済学
    • 応用数学

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