The adoption of poison pills and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from Japan

Yasuhiro Arikawa*, Yosuke Mitsusada

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

4 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

Using Japanese cases, this paper presents evidence that the adoption of poison pills reveals private information about preferences for managerial entrenchment to the stock market. We find that this private information revelation effect is the reason for the stock price decline with the announcement of poison pill defenses. The stock market considers the adoption of a poison pill to be a signal that the manager wishes to entrench him/herself. We also find that a CEO with longer tenure is more likely to adopt a poison pill when the performance of the firm is poor.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)63-77
ページ数15
ジャーナルJapan and The World Economy
23
1
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2011 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学
  • 政治学と国際関係論

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