The balanced contributions property for equal contributors

Koji Yokote*, Takumi Kongo, Yukihiko Funaki

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

We introduce a new axiom, which we term the balanced contributions property for equal contributors. This axiom is defined by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property (Myerson, 1980) to two players whose contributions to the grand coalition are the same. We prove that this axiom, together with efficiency and weak covariance, characterizes a new class of solutions, termed the r-egalitarian Shapley values. This class subsumes many variants of the Shapley value, e.g., the egalitarian Shapley values and the discounted Shapley values. Our characterization provides a new axiomatic foundation for analyzing variants of the Shapley value in a unified manner.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)113-124
ページ数12
ジャーナルGames and Economic Behavior
108
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2018 3月

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 財務
  • 経済学、計量経済学

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