The balanced contributions property for symmetric players

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo*

*この研究の対応する著者

研究成果: Article査読

7 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.

本文言語English
ページ(範囲)227-231
ページ数5
ジャーナルOperations Research Letters
45
3
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2017 5月 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • ソフトウェア
  • 経営科学およびオペレーションズ リサーチ
  • 産業および生産工学
  • 応用数学

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