The balanced contributions property for symmetric players

Koji Yokote, Takumi Kongo

    研究成果: Article

    4 引用 (Scopus)

    抄録

    This paper introduces a new relational axiom, the balanced contributions property for symmetric players, in TU cooperative games. It describes the fair treatment of symmetric players by restricting the requirement of the balanced contributions property to two symmetric players. Even under efficiency, our new axiom is logically independent of symmetry, which requires that symmetric players receive the same payoff. Nonetheless, in previous axiomatizations of an anonymous solution, replacing symmetry with our new axiom results in new axiomatizations of the solution.

    元の言語English
    ページ(範囲)227-231
    ページ数5
    ジャーナルOperations Research Letters
    45
    発行部数3
    DOI
    出版物ステータスPublished - 2017 5 1

    Fingerprint

    Axiom
    Axiomatization
    TU Game
    Symmetry
    Cooperative Game
    Requirements
    Cooperative TU games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Software
    • Management Science and Operations Research
    • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
    • Applied Mathematics

    これを引用

    The balanced contributions property for symmetric players. / Yokote, Koji; Kongo, Takumi.

    :: Operations Research Letters, 巻 45, 番号 3, 01.05.2017, p. 227-231.

    研究成果: Article

    Yokote, Koji ; Kongo, Takumi. / The balanced contributions property for symmetric players. :: Operations Research Letters. 2017 ; 巻 45, 番号 3. pp. 227-231.
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